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1.Introduction
The Minimalist Program (TMP) is comparable to many of Chomsky's 
earlier major linguistic contributions.FN* This volume also powerfully 
integrates several strands of research into an exciting and 
intellectually seductive novel view of the field and proceeds to 
develop and elaborate sometimes in great detail various aspects of 
the resulting picture.
Chapter one, co-authored by Howard Lasnik is an overview of 
the final stages of the principles and parameters (aka government 
binding) theory, which already contains some hints of ideas to come. 
Chapter two (re)introduces the notion of economy, chapter three 
correspond to the paper that originally outlined the basic ideas of 
the minimalist enterprise and chapter four contains many further 
developments.
Chapter four very thoroughly revises an earlier paper ("Bare 
Phrase Structure"), the other three chapters are reprints with minor 
revisions of published earlier articles. This state of affairs of 
course results in repetitions and inconsistencies. In fact it results 
in much fewer repetitions and many more inconsistencies than might 
be expected purely on the basis of the bibligraphical history. Each 
chapter rejects and revises much of the general framework of 
previous chapters, sometimes, especially in the case of chapter four, 
even that of earlier sections. But this is a "creative inconsistency" 
where each successive theory builds on and rebuilds the earlier 
ones. I find much of this highly inspiring, although it is well known, 
that many find it objectionable. Detractors can justifiably note that 
this style of writing led in TMP to numerous, sometimes more, 
sometimes less trivial inconsistencies and other related problems,
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even internal to the various versions of the framework presented.
But to make the point somewhat metaphorically, when I listen to a 
grand master piano player with a unique message, understanding 
and insight to communicate, it does not seem too important if he 
sometimes hits the wrong keys. And I wonder who would prefer the 
flawless alternative of the computer generated or similar rendition.
In what follows I will not attempt to point out such "false 
notes". Instead, I shall try to identify some major features of TMP 
that may not be fully justified and concentrate on comparing this 
approach with an alternative that is related in spirit but leads to a 
rather different theory of grammar.
2. Some features of the minimalist program
The original paper "A Minimalist Program for Linguistic Theory", now 
also chapter 3 of TMP, brings together at least three major lines of 
research. First, there is a set of ideas concerning phrase structure 
and in particular specifiers. One of these ideas is the project of 
restricting the set of possible structural relations. An important 
suggestion is the elimination of the notion of government, a central 
concept in the Principles and Parameters theory. No direct relation 
is taken to hold between a head (eg. a verb) and the specifier (eg. 
a DP subject) of another head. Another is checking theory: syntactic 
movement (the most important among the descendants of the 
transformations in a sixties style transformational grammar) takes 
place only when forced, and it can be forced only by the need to 
establish a specifier-head (checking) configuration between certain 
features of the elements involved.
The second major element of the mixture is the restriction of 
representational conditions to the interface levels. It is a standard 
assumption that syntax relates the articulatory/perceptual- and the
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conceptual-interpretive systems by providing instructions for these 
at two interface levels: Logical Form (LF) and Phonetic Form (PF) 
respectvely. Optimally, no conditions should hold at other levels, or 
essentially equivalently, no additional level of syntactic analysis 
should be postulated. Furthemore, we might hope to show that most, 
or perhaps all, interface conditions reflect interpretive requirements, 
that is they are consequences of the fact that syntax interacts with 
external systems with given independenly motivated properties.
The third major ingredient is the idea of economy of 
derivations and representations, already reintroduced in the 
previous chapter. Economy of representation is simply a principle of 
full interpretation at the interface: "every symbol must receive an 
"external" interpretation by language independent rules". Economy 
of derivation comprises a set of diverse conditions, for example: 
derivations must be as short as possible, steps in a derivation must 
bridge the smallest possible distance, movement takes place only if 
forced by some checking requirement and takes place as late as 
possible in the derivation.
3. Derivations and Representations
Some readers of Mind and Language with encyclopaedic memory 
might remember a discussion in this journal in 1987 relating to 
Chomsky's then recent book "Knowledge of Language". My 
contribution to the discussion consisted in an argument based on 
the theory of thematic/"theta" roles, that the basic syntactic level is 
not D-structure (the standard view at the time), nor S-structure (as 
some have suggested) but LF. Chomsky in his answer attacked the 
view that all syntactic levels other than LF are dispensable and that 
the D-structure to LF (via S-structure) derivation is not real.
These arguments were somewhat misdirected, since the proposal he
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criticised did not dispense with these theoretical entities, it only- 
suggested that in place of the standard derivation we should 
substitute a system where S- and D-structure are abstracted from 
LF via some algorithm/ derivation.FN1 A couple of years after this 
debate I did in fact start to argue for the related stronger claim 
that Chomsky attacked, at least with respect to D-structure.FN2
Chapter 3 of TMP eliminates D-structure on the same grounds 
as Brody 1993.FN3 It also makes the further step of eliminating S- 
structure as a level where representational conditions can hold by 
successfully restating the relevant restrictions at LF. Eliminating D- 
and S-structure are precisely the hypotheses that Chomsky once 
argued against in connection with my proposal in this journal, and 
of course these steps entail also the (weaker) position I took at the 
time, that LF is the "basic" syntactic level of representation.
The theory of TMP does not embrace, however, a position that 
is different in every respect from that of Chomsky 1987. In 
particular, both publications assume the existence of syntactic 
derivations relating the lexical input to the interface level LF. But, 
in my view, this is precisely one of the aspects of the overall 
organization of the grammar in TMP which is unjustified, and 
probably wrong. I argued in Brody 1995aFN4, that derivations and 
properties of LF representations duplicate each other (for example 
movement and chains express the same relation) and that therefore a 
parsimonous theory of syntax should dispense either with 
representations or with derivations. I opted for the representational 
alternative, others have since explored the derivational approach.
The representational view still seems preferable to me on general 
grounds partly because it is more restrictive than the derivational 
theory in that it does not allow reference to rule order relations.
Thus it rules out in principle the so-called feeding-bleeding 
relations in rule application sequences. Such relations do not seem
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to exist in syntax at all, but we would expect them to be 
commonplace on the derivational theory. (Note that this issue is 
different from the question of how the order of rule application is 
determined.) Independently of the choice between the fully 
derivational and the fully representational theory, it is clear that 
the framework of TMP, which postulates both representations and 
derivations, is the least restrictive and hence in principle the least 
explanatory of the three approaches.
I will not look again at the main argument for derivations 
based on the properties of successive head-movement presented in 
Chomsky 1987, which reappears also at several places in TMP. I have 
discussed in detail and rejected this in Brody 1995a, pp 35-40. In 
this work I also noted that derivational economy conditions are 
generally quite easily restateable in representational terms.
The Principles and Parameters theory had a characteristic 
forking organization, that the theory of TMP inherited. The 
derivation proceeded to S-structure, which served as an input to 
the phonological component and then continued to LF. The minimalist 
theory eliminates S-structure as a level where representational 
conditions hold, and allows the phonological — now "Spellout"—  
(sub)module to apply in principle to any point of the derivation.
Like the Principles and Parameters theory, this framework 
incorporates a distinction between (pre S-structure/ pre Spellout- 
point) operations that constitute "visible" input to phonology and 
(post S-structure/ post Spellout-point) "invisible", covert operations. 
The distinction was natural within the earlier framework: syntax 
consisted of the D- to S-structure mapping and was overt, while the 
two interpretive components (S-structure to LF and to PF) were 
inaccessible to each other. But the assumption is less natural in 
TMP.
It is less natural because TMP incorporates the insight that
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there is no stipulated difference between the overt and the covert 
computations, — "computational procedures are uniform throughout"
(p. 229). (This is not contradicted by the fact that covert operations 
in practice have different properties from the overt ones, due to the 
interaction of computation-independent assumptions, cf. also below.) 
Thus the Spellout-point is now not the divide that S-structure was 
between syntax and interpretation. It is an arbitrary point on the 
uniform syntactic derivation between the lexical input and LF. But 
this is strange: the relation between PF and LF is mediated by a 
Spellout component, together with some arbitrary subpart 
(potentially different from language to language and construction 
from construction) of the system of uniform computational 
procedures that assembles LF representations from lexical elements.
Other, perhaps more tangible, problems also arise in this 
setup. Less worrying are the recoverability issues. Various proposals 
have been made concerning the question of how lexical insertion of 
elements with phonological material might be prevented in the 
covert, post-Spellout syntax, where this would not result in any PF 
effects. Allowing this option, "John left" could mean for example 
"Mary said John left" with covert insertion of the elements of the 
matrix clause "Mary said...’. TMP excludes this possibility by 
assuming that PF features must not be present at LF. This makes it 
necessary to stipulate that the Spellout operation, in addition to 
copying PF features (the minimal assumption), also deletes —
"strips”— these from the covert part of the lexicon to LF 
computation. In the case of post Spellout-point lexical insertion PF 
features cannot be deleted and will illegitimately reach LF.
It is not clear, however, why PF features could not be ignored 
by the interpretive component at LF, after all in the framework of 
TMP the syntactic computation must be able to ignore them. (There 
is a more general issue in the background here: namely what are
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the units for the principle of "full interpretation".) Furthermore, 
even if PF features must be deleted from the syntactic computation, 
optimally we would expect this to happen freely. Restricting the 
option to the Spellout point seems to exchange the stipulation 
against covert lexical insertion for another.
A universal global recoverability condition that relates PF and 
LF may well be an acceptable alternative answer to the issue of 
covert lexical insertion. A more serious problem is again the 
looseness in the theory. Empty category (ie. category without 
phonological material) insertion for example is now possible both 
overtly and covertly, but the additional freedom allowed here is not 
justified by any arguments in the literature establishing its 
necessity. Similarly, if properties of movement in fact differ in the 
overt and covert part of the syntactic derivation, then covert type 
movement (feature movement) can in principle occur both before 
(cf. Watanabe 1992, quoted approvingly in TMP, p.264.) and of course 
also after the Spellout point.
In the fully representational theory, these problems do not 
arise. Since there is only a single syntactic representation, LF, and 
no derivations, Spellout can necessarily only apply to this level.
This creates however a different problem: LF was standardly taken 
to be a level that is different from S-structure: in both the 
principles and parameters and the minimalist theory movement rules 
operate between S-structure/Spellout point and LF, just like 
between D-structure/lexical input and S-structure/Spellout point. If 
movement rules make LF different from S-structure, then LF can be 
the Spellout point only if Spellout contains an (inverse) movement 
algorithm. But given the fact noted above that movement rules 
duplicate LF chains, the inverse movement approach seems equally 
incorrect: it simply places the duplication into a different component 
of the grammar.
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To resolve this difficulty, without denying that covert 
movement relations in crucial respects form a natural class with 
overt movement relations, I argued that covert movement relations 
correspond to LF chains just like overt movement relations, but LF 
and S-structure/Spellout point do not differ with respect to the 
placement of phonological material. (Others argued against the 
standard position of the principles and parameters theory that overt 
and covert movement relations have enough properties in common to 
consider them a natural class, now also TMP partly rejects rejects 
the claim — for A'-relations— , but I believe incorrectly.FN5) I 
referred to the relevant type of chains as "expletive-associate" 
chains, where a lexical or empty expletive element carries the 
features of its associate chain-mate. Interestingly, chapter 4 of TMP 
proposes a characterization of covert movement, "feature movement", 
that corresponds exactly (apart from certain fairly technical 
differences and the choice of the derivational idiom) to the 
expletive-associate chain proposal. Under the feature movement 
hypothesis, like under the expletive-associate chain account there is 
no covert deplacement of phonological material in the grammar. It 
becomes then particularly difficult to see, why the Spellout point 
should be distinct from LF, since with respect to the topology of the 
phonological material the two structures cannot differ. And of course 
if the Spellout point is in fact LF then it becomes even more 
difficult to assign a role and a raison d'etre to syntactic 
derivations.
4. Perfection
According to TMP then, a computational system, part of linguistic 
competence puts together from lexical items the interface 
representation LF. All representational conditions hold at the
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interface levels and beyond. Syntax is taken to be a near perfect 
system where the only imperfections are those, that the external 
interacting systems force on syntax.
For example TMP takes the existence of the rule of "Move" (ie. 
movement transformation) to be such an imperfection. It assumes 
that optimally lexical items would be assembled into syntactic 
structures by the relatively simple operation of "Merge". Move is 
due to ""extraneous" conditions..., conditions imposed on [the 
computational system] by the ways it interacts with external 
systems. That is where we would hope the source of "imperfections" 
to lie, on minimalist assumptions" (p. 317)
Similarly, once we have Move, TMP takes covert post-Spellout 
point movement of features (in my terminology expletive-associate 
chains) to be the optimal case. TMP introduces two (I believe) 
alternative hypotheses concerning pre-Spellout point movement of 
more than the grammatical features involved in checking relations 
(ie. movement of full categories together with their phonological 
material). One of these is that such movement is due to a special 
checking feature. Another assumption is that it is due to PF 
requirements, "...only PF-convergence forces anything beyond 
features to raise. If that turns out to be true or to the extent that 
it does, we have further reasons to suspect that language 
"imperfections" arise from the external requirement that the 
computational principles must adapt to the sensory-motor apparatus, 
which is in a certain sense "extraneous" to the core systems of 
language as revealed in the [lexical input to LF] computation"
(p.265).
The view that external systems force imperfections on syntax 
is rather surprising. I think the desirability of this idea fades when 
it is compared with an alternative that is based on more standard 
methodology. According to this alternative picture, the observed
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imperfections are only apparent, and the fact that they show up is 
due to the interaction of otherwise "perfect" subsystems. This view 
is of course more restrictive and therefore preferable if facts allow 
us to maintain it. Let me refer to the framework that rejects the 
idea of (externally forced) syntactic imperfections as "perfect 
syntax". FN6 I take syntax to be perfect in the sense in which for 
example the propositional calculus is perfect: a system with a simple 
set of primitives and axioms. Of course the nature of syntax remains 
an empirical question: syntax is one modul of a larger system of our 
mind-brain.
In the setting of TMP arguments based on general 
considerations similar to those in the physical sciences, like 
simplicity, symmetry, nonredundancy etc. are at last wholeheartedly 
accepted. Provisos that these features may be surprising properties 
in biological systems are not taken to weaken the force of such 
arguments any more and the issue such provisos raise is placed 
where it appears to belong: it is "a problem for biology and the 
brain sciences, which, as currently understood, do not provide any 
basis for what appear to be fairly well established conclusions about 
language" (p.2). But this background, it seems to me, removes any 
remaining general motivation to deviate from the standard 
methodology, according to which "data imperfections" do not point to 
imperfections in the underlying systems, but rather result either 
from the interplay of perfect systems or simply from our incomplete 
understanding of these.
Furthermore, in order to deviate from the optimal assumption 
of syntactic perfection, it would be necessary to demonstrate that 
this is in conflict with external requirements. But not only has this 
not been demonstrated, it is very unlikely (without of course being 
logically impossible), given the current state of our knowledge, that 
anything of the sort could be convincingly shown. This is because
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the system of perfect syntax is not a priory given, whenever a 
perfect system is in conflict with external requirements, there is 
always a possibility that a different perfect system would not create 
the conflict.
For concreteness, let us look at the assumption in TMP that 
Move is an imperfection forced by LF checking requirements. If 
Move was really an imperfection, we would like to know, why it 
cannot be avoided by say, freely deleting checking features or by 
checking features being always generated in a position that is 
accessible without Move, etc. Further possibilities are easily 
imaginable and numerous: in order to demonstrate conflict between 
external requirements and Move-less perfection all would need to be 
excluded on principled grounds. Nothing like this has been 
established, or looks demonstrable. Remember also, that although the 
result would in some sense be interesting, it would not be a 
desirable one. (Similar comments apply in the case of the idea that 
overt Move of categories and phonological material is a forced 
imperfection. How do we rule out overt movement restricted to the 
Spellout component, how do we rule out free deletion of strong 
features etc, etc.)
Perfect syntax can be thought of as a theory that attempts to 
take the minimalist program at least in certain respects to its logical 
conclusion. It is therefore interesting to observe, that already at 
this early stage it is clear that the outlines of this approach will 
look completely different from the picture TMP draws. The step of 
disallowing the remaining (forced) syntactic imperfections of TMP 
might seem to be minor, but it naturally leads to the rejection of 
many of the central differentiating features of this theory. Let me 
try to indicate very sketchily and without any attempt at 
justification some major differences (cf. Brody 1995b,c for more 
discussion and initial arguments).
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First, since perfect syntax does not allow imperfections, Move 
cannot be one. It is therefore necessary to find a different 
conceptualization for this relation. Given the representational nature 
of perfect syntax, one obvious alternative is the copy relation. Move 
creates LF copies in TMP, properties of Move can in principle be 
taken to be properties of the relevant copy relation. Importantly, 
unlike Move, the copy relation does not seem to be an imperfection: 
it appears to be a necessary feature in syntax, given its relation to 
the lexicon. Lexical items must be in a copy relation with their 
correspondants in a syntactic structure. An entry does not 
disappear from the lexicon when used syntactically.
Another approach might be to partly eliminate the Move 
relation from syntax. Although the point must of course be 
substantiated, which I cannot undertake here, I find this possibility 
worth exploring. Suppose that the conceptual-semantic interpretive 
system optionally takes two identical elements to be in the relevant 
"Move" relation (abstractly understood, not involving movement). In 
most, and perhaps all cases, there will be independently motivated 
principles violated if the wrong choice is made. It is generally 
assumed that the Spellout rule needs to know about the movement 
history of a derivation, since it needs to distinguish copies that are 
traces of Move from others. If the abstract "Move" relation is 
established only at a post-syntactical level L, then L and PF will 
need to be linked by a global recoverability condition. But such a 
recoverability condition between PF and some non-phonological level 
may be necessary anyway, given the natural inclusiveness condition 
of TMP, that prevents lexicon-extraneous marking of elements as 
having participated in a Move relation.
Secondly, the strategy of TMP appears to be to attribute 
nonoptimal syntactic properties to the Move relation, presumably on 
the assumption that Move is an imperfection in any case, hence the
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fact that it shows non-optimal properties is not surprising. The more 
restrictive framework of perfect syntax cannot proceed this way.
There are reasons to think that some of the putative properties of 
Move (e.g. c-command, last resort) may be more general and not 
Move-specific properties, others like "chain-uniformity" dissolve 
given an improved theory of phrase structure. Thus perfection in 
the domain of chain theory does not appear to be obviously out of 
reach either. A number of issues, mostly having to do with questions 
of locality, remain. These may be taken to provide evidence for the 
alternative where the "Move" relation between copies is syntax 
external.
A third difference between perfect syntax and TMP concerns 
economy conditions. In the system of TMP interface conditions will 
be satisfied "as well as possible", as measured and ensured by 
economy conditions. But if there are no (externally forced) 
imperfections, no economy conditions may be necessary to ensure 
that the conditions are satisfied optimally. If there are no 
imperfections, there is no need to measure and compare degrees of 
imperfection. Such a conclusion is consistent with the fact that even 
within TMP, the role of economy conditions seems to shrink 
considerably by the end of the book. Chomsky argues forcefully in 
chapter 4 that one of the paradigm cases of economy in chapter 3, 
the shortest derivational steps restriction is in fact not an economy 
condition. It is often easy to restate many of the other global 
economy conditions as computationally simpler "default" or licensing 
conditions, preventing optionality. (Perhaps the only unexplained 
residue once the derivational economy principles of TMP are 
eliminated in this fashion will then be a small empirical advantage 
for the shortest derivation — representationally: "minimize number of 
chain-links"—  condition, generated by some highly controversial 
assumptions that Chomsky makes (p. 357).)
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The fourth major difference I already touched on earlier: 
perfect syntax cannot assume the redundant and much looser 
derivational-representational system of TMP. This leads to a 
necessary rejection of various theoretical innovations. I mention here 
just one, which seems to be important enough to merit being 
considered to be a fifth central difference between the two theories. 
In chapter 4 of TMP Chomsky introduces a difference between 
interpretable and non-interpretable checking features. Non­
interpretable features are visible for the derivation, but cannot be 
tolerated at LF, given the principle of full interpretation. 
Interpretable features can be present both during the derivation 
and at the interface. Interesting consequences follow from this 
distinction.
But a distinction in such terms is natural only in the 
nonrestrictive framework, where both representations and 
derivations are postulated. Non-interpretable features are 
derivational in the sense of not being allowed to be present at the 
(sole) syntactic representation LF, while interpretable features can 
exist both derivationally and representationally. Since interpretable 
features presumably cannot be eliminated from the theory, perfect 
syntax must dispense with non-interpretable ones. This more 
restrictive framework has the nontrivial task of accounting for the 
predictions achieved through this distinction, but without assuming 
it. Furthermore, the assumption that all syntactic features must be 
semantically interpretable is a natural further restriction on 
syntactic primitives and as such it is desirable independently of the 
derivational/representational duplication issue. Note that the 
hypothesis that there are no solely PF motivated syntactic features 
takes seriously the spirit of the remark in TMP quoted earlier, 
according to which the "core systems of language" involve the 
lexicon-LF interaction, with an extraneous Spellout system.
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In sum Perfect syntax, in contrast to TMP, makes the optimal 
assumption and aims to eliminate forced and unforced imperfections 
from syntax as a matter of principle. When the consequences of this 
more restrictive approach are examined, it quickly turns out to lead 
to a picture of the syntactic competence that is rather different 
from the one presented in TMP.
There are at least two central features of Chomsky's syntactic 
theories that either remained constant through the various 
framework metamorphoses or had a tendency to reincarnate and 
which I beleive are empirically unjustified as part of syntactic 
theory. The first is the mixed, partly derivational nature of the 
system, and the second a notion of measurement and comparison, 
once an aspect of the long abandoned "evaluation metric", now 
resurfacing in the rather different shape of economy conditions, 
part of a particular interpretation of syntactic perfection. These 
ideas are central, and establishing their truth or falsity is important 
for the field, and quite likely beyond it. But these and the other 
related issues I tried to sketch, should be set against the 
background of Chomsky's major and ongoing contribution of creating 
a scientific field of linguistics. To this enterprise TMP, whatever its 
imperfections, added perhaps more than any of his other works 
since The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory.
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Notes
FN* I am grateful to Neil Smith and Michal Starke for very helpful
comments. This review was written in the Summer of 1996 at the request of Mind
and Language, where it will eventually appear.
FN1 Cf. Brody 1995a pp. 35-40 for discussion.
FN2 Cf. Brody 1993.
FN3 Originally written in 1989/1990. Cf. also Brody 1995a, pp.25-29 
for discussion.
FN4 Apart from some revisions, written in 1991/92.
FN5 Cf. Chapter 2 of Brody 1995a, among a number of other recent 
publications in a similar vein.
FN6 As in Brody 1995b,c.
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